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ONE JUDGE'S PERSPECTIVE ON
PROCEDURE AS CONTRACT
Lee H. Rosenthal*
INTRODUCTION

Professor Resnik does judges a great service by asking us to examine our encouragement of the resolution of disputes by means
other than litigation. 1 She chronicles judges' progressively stronger
embrace of what she terms the "outsourcing" of dispute resolution
from public decisions by judges and juries in courthouses to private
dispositions by arbitrators and mediators. 2 Recognizing that such outsourcing is here to stay, Professor Resnik asks us to think about how
judges should respond to what they helped create.
Judges primarily encounter arbitration when there is a dispute as
to whether and how arbitration will occur and when there is a dispute
as to whether and how the results of arbitration will be enforced.
Both "entrance" issues, involving the enforceability of arbitration
agreements, and "exit" issues, involving challenges to the effects of
arbitration, provide a useful way to think about how "contract procedure" relates to "due process procedure." This examination turns to
further reflection on why different categories of litigants are seeking
alternatives to litigation and whether courts can provide some reasons
for them to stay.
I.

ENTRANCE ISSUES AND THE ARBITRATION OF MASS CLAIMS

It has been clear law for a generation of judges and litigants that
arbitration agreements are enforceable on the same footing as other
contracts. 3 It is less clear how to enforce arbitration agreements in
* United States District CourtJudge, Southern District of Texas. I would like to
thank Rick Hess for his assistance in preparing this Article.
1 SeeJudith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 593 (2005).
2 Id. at 619-21.
3 See Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified
as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2000)); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson, 490 U.S.
477, 483-84 (1989); John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 551 n.4
(1964) (stating that "when a contract is scrutinized for evidence of an intention to
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the form contracts many businesses use in providing services and
goods to consumers. One particularly vexing issue arises at the intersection of class actions and arbitration. There is uncertainty when
consumer contracts have arbitration clauses that say nothing about
class actions and there is uncertainty when consumer contracts have
arbitration clauses that preclude class treatment.
State and federal courts are struggling on an ongoing and increasing basis with mass claims in consumer cases. 4 Manufacturers
and distributors of all kinds of products and services include, in boilerplate "contracts" with consumers, language eschewing courts and requiring arbitration of any disputes that might arise. 5 Many of those
"contracts" have been silent on the question of class-wide arbitration.
In Green Tree FinancialCorp. v. Bazzle, 6 the Supreme Court addressed a
state court's decision ordering class arbitration under state law. The
arbitration agreement was silent about whether class arbitration was
forbidden or allowed. After concluding that the agreement did not
expressly forbid class arbitration, a plurality of the Court held that
"[u]nder the terms of the parties' contracts, the question-whether
the agreement forbids class arbitration-is for the arbitrator to
decide."

7

Under the usual construction principle, one looks to "'that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds.'"8 In Green Tree, Justice Stevens, whose concurrence in the judgment constituted the fifth vote, dissented to the extent that he would have permitted the state court decision allowing
class arbitration to stand. 9 He reasoned that the decision was correct
as a matter of law because nothing in the state court's application of
arbitrate a particular kind of dispute, national labor policy requires, within reason,
that 'an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute be favored'") (quoting United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960)).
4 See, e.g.,
William W Schwarzer, StructuringMulticlaim Litigation: Should Rule 23
Be Revised?, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1250, 1250 (1996); AnthonyJ. Scirica, Introduction:Symposium, Mass Torts, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1859, 1860-61 (2000); Edward F. Sherman, Consumer Class Actions: Who Are the Real Winners?, 56 ME. L. REV. 223, 223 n.2 (2004).
5 See, e.g., Robert A. Schwartz, Can Arbitration Do More for Consumers? The TILA

Class Action Reconsidered, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 809, 809 (2003) ("Businesses have become
enamored of arbitration clauses. These boilerplate contractual provisions . . .have
become a part of everyday commercial life.").
6 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
7 Id. at 451 (plurality opinion).
8 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
9 Green Tree, 539 U.S. at 454-55 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part).

2005]

ONE JUDGE'S

PRESPECTIVE

ON

PROCEDURE

AS CONTRACT

671

state law to allow class arbitration violated the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA), and the petitioner challenged only the merits of that decision,
not whether it was made by the right decisionmaker. I ° Nevertheless,
Justice Stevens also stated that "[a]rguably the interpretation of the
parties' agreement should have been made in the first instance by the
arbitrator, rather than the court."" The four-member plurality specifically rejected the legal interpretation the state court had applied because it was a decision by the wrong decisionmaker. The grounds of
the Justice Stevens concurrence also differed from the three-member
dissent, which would have upheld the state court's ability to make the
decision but would have reversed on the merits of that court's decision to allow class arbitration.1 2 Justice Stevens did express his agreement, however, with the principle laid down by the plurality that
arbitrators should be the first ones to interpret the parties'
3
agreement. 1
In arriving at its decision, the Green Tree plurality relied on two
considerations. First, it found that the contract's provision to submit
to arbitration "[a]ll disputes, claims, or controversies arising from or
relating to this contract or the relationships which result from this
contract" reflected the parties' intent to commit a broad range of
questions to arbitration, including the class arbitration question because that question "relat[ed] to the contract."' 14 Second, the plurality
reasoned that there exists only a narrow exception for certain "gateway" matters that parties normally expect a court rather than an arbitrator to decide. These include: (1) "whether the parties have a valid
arbitration agreement at all" and (2) "whether a concededly binding
arbitration clause applies to a certain type of controversy."1 5 Because
the question whether a contract forbids class arbitration concerns the
"kind of arbitration proceeding the parties agreed to," and not "the
validity of the arbitration clause nor its applicability to the underlying
dispute between the parties," the plurality concluded that arbitrators
16
are "well situated to answer that question."'
If the scope of an arbitration agreement is broad and the issue
concerns the kind of arbitration proceeding agreed to, the plurality,
plus Justice Stevens, would conclude that "this matter of contract in10

Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).

11

Id. at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).

12
13
14
15
16

Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 448 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 452 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 452-53 (plurality opinion) (emphasis omitted).
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terpretation should be for the arbitrator, not the courts, to decide." 17
But the only holding of Green Tree is that, at least when an arbitration
provision is silent-or perhaps ambiguous-on whether class-wide arbitration is allowed or not, the arbitrator is to decide whether the arbitration agreement forbids or allows class arbitration.
Despite this holding, the Court in Green Tree made the initial determination that the language of the arbitration agreement did not
clearly forbid class arbitration. The Court stated that it "must deal...
at the outset" with the argument that the contracts forbade class arbitration, "for if it is right, then the South Carolina court's holding [that
the contracts were silent] is flawed on its own terms."1 8 As the Fifth
Circuit has recognized,
it is unclear why the Court would explore this issue in the first place
if its ultimate conclusion was that a court, regardless of whether its
interpretation of the law is right or wrong, is simply the wrong decision-maker .... [I]f the arbitration provision clearly did forbid class
arbitration, then the arbitrators could-and under Green Tree
should-make this call without any prior analysis by a court. 19
Under the Court's holding, it should not be necessary for a court
to decide initially whether an arbitration agreement clearly forbids or
permits class arbitration. Even that issue is for the arbitrator to
decide.
Since Green Tree, courts have allowed arbitrators to decide what
might be considered "entrance" issues, which courts could have asserted a legitimate basis for deciding. One federal district court considered both Green Tree and prior circuit law in deciding that the
court, rather than the arbitrator, should interpret an arbitration
clause's putative forum selection clause. 20 The district court reasoned
that although "venue ...may be said to relate to 'what kind of arbitration proceeding' the parties agreed to"-and therefore remain an arbitrator's decision-decisions from the First, Second, Seventh and
Eleventh Circuits have held that the FAA "compels a court to interpret
and enforce such forum-selection clauses." 21 The First Circuit reversed, stating that the district court "lacked power to interpret the
17 Id. at 453 (plurality opinion).
18 Id. at 450 (plurality opinion).
19 Pedcor Mgmt. Co. Welfare Benefit Plan v. Nations Pets. of Tex., 343 F.3d 355,
360 (5th Cir. 2003).
20 Richard C. Young & Co. v. Leventhal, 298 F. Supp. 2d 160, 166-68 (D. Mass.
2003).
21 Id. at 167-68 (citing KKW Enters., Inc. v. Gloria Jean's Gourmet Coffees
Franchising Corp., 184 F.3d 42, 50 (1st Cir. 1999); McCullagh v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 177 F.3d 1307, 1310 (llth Cir. 1999); Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc. v. Bennett,
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forum selection clause. '22 Because the dispute was clearly arbitrable,
the appellate court concluded that under Green Tree and Howsam v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,23 the arbitrator had to interpret the contract's forum selection clause, not the court.
Because Green Tree applies to arbitration agreements governed by
a hybrid of both the FAA and state law, it is less clear what the result
would be if the arbitration provision were governed exclusively by
state arbitration law. Courts have held that 'just as parties may select
the arbitral rules governing arbitration, they may also 'specify the law
24
governing interpretation of the scope of the arbitration clause."'
The parties may select state law and may specifically exclude the application of federal law. It is unclear whether arbitration agreements
governed exclusively by state law would be controlled by the Court's
holding in Green Tree. Nothing in Texas arbitration law, for example,
whether an
mandates that a court rather than an arbitrator determine
25
arbitration agreement contemplates class arbitration.
Green Tree and subsequent cases continue the tradition of courts
supporting arbitration and narrowing the judicial role in the "entrance" or "gateway" decisions that precede arbitration. Courts are,
however, more assertive when the threshold issues move from "contractual procedure" to "due process procedure." When the issue is
not whether the arbitration agreement permits class arbitration, but
whether an arbitration agreement that clearly forbids class actions is
26
The
enforceable, courts make the decision, albeit inconsistently.
Ninth Circuit has struck down an arbitration agreement for, among
other reasons, the inclusion of a bar on class arbitrations, applying
California law to hold that it is so one-sided and substantively unconscionable as to be unenforceable. 27 California state law recognizes the
availability of class-wide arbitration on the ground that state law doc938 F.2d 31, 32 (2d Cir. 1991); Snyder v. Smith, 736 F.2d 409, 418 (7th Cir. 1984),
overruled on other grounds by Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873 (7th Cir. 1998)).
22 Richard C. Young & Co. v. Leventhal, No. 04-1124, 2004 WL 2415056, at *4
(1st Cir. Oct. 28, 2004).
23 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
24 Pedcor Mgmt. Co., 343 F.3d at 361 (quoting Ford v. NYLCare Health Plans of
the Gulf Coast, Inc., 141 F.3d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 1998)).
25

See TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 171.001-.098 (Vernon 1997 & Supp.

2004-2005).
26 SeeJean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or UnconscionableAbuse?, LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 75, 78 n.13 (collecting cases).
27 Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1175 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying
California law); see also Luna v. Household Fin. Corp. III, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1179
(W.D. Wash. 2002) (applying Washington law).
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trines such as unconscionability apply in state court actions under the
FAA.2 8 Pennsylvania has also permitted class arbitrations. 29 Other
courts have enforced arbitration clauses containing class action
prohibitions, in some cases rejecting unconscionability arguments,
and in other cases finding an insufficient basis for concluding that the
arbitration would be inadequate to vindicate statutory rights.3 0 The
outcomes of the cases are inconsistent, varying in ways that reflect differences in state law as well as differences among the courts. But the
courts are clear that whether an arbitration agreement can validly preclude class actions is an issue for the court, not the arbitrator. When
the gateway procedural issue is not one of contract, but of fundamental fairness-due process procedure, to use Professor Resnik's termthe courts have maintained their role and have not deferred to the
arbitrator.
The future of class arbitrations is not clear. The scant empirical
information available shows a variation in the prevalence of arbitration clauses by industry, with the most frequent use in industries that
depend on written contracts with consumers, such as financial services.31 When arbitration clauses were used in consumer contracts,
fewer than one-third prohibited class actions within the arbitration
28 See Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1209-10 (Cal. 1982), rev'd on
other grounds, Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Blue Cross of Cal. v.
Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779, 791-93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); Lewis v. PrudentialBache Sec., Inc., 225 Cal. Rptr. 69, 75-76 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). But see Discover Bank
v. Superior Court, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 393, 407-09 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003), review granted
and opinion superceded by 65 P.3d 1285 (Cal. 2003). Two Ninth Circuit cases after Discover Bank apply the prior rule. See Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1176 n.15 (rejecting Discover
Bank as contradicted by state precedent and by text and judicial interpretations of
FAA); Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1150 n.15 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting DiscoverBank
as contrary to U.S. Supreme Court precedent and stating that state law, including
contract doctrines like unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration
agreements without contravening the FAA).
29 Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d 860, 867 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991).
30 See, e.g., Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala., 244 F.3d 814, 817-19 (lth
Cir. 2001) (holding that the Truth in Lending Act did not create a non-waiveable
right to use the class action device); Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366,
374-75 (3d Cir. 2000) (enforcing an arbitration clause's class action waiver and stating that "[w]hatever the benefits of class actions, the FAA requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement" (citation omitted));
Pick v. Discover Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 00-935-SLR, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15777, at *16
(D. Del. Sept. 28, 2001) (mem.) (rejecting argument that arbitration clauses are generally unconscionable if they preclude class actions).
31 Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, "Volunteering" to Arbitrate Through
Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experience, 67 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 55, 62 (2004) (finding that thirty-five percent of sampled businesses included
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proceedings and more than two-thirds made no provision for class actions.3 2 Class actions in arbitration are no longer a rarity. In light of
Green Tree, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) is providing
33
The AAA
assistance in organizing consolidated or class arbitrations.
in pararbitration
has stated that it will administer demands for class
ticular circumstances and has developed rules to accommodate these
types of cases.
Class arbitrations of consumer claims may siphon even more
cases from the courts. The irony is that consumer claims are precisely
the category of class actions that the Supreme Court has stated are
most appropriately handled in federal courts under Rule 23 and state
court counterparts. As the Supreme Court stated in Amchem Products,
Inc. v. Windsor, class actions are best used to vindicate "'the rights of
groups of people who individually would be without effective strength
to bring their opponents into court at all.'" 34 The Court cited Mace v.
Van Ru Credit Corp., which stated that
the policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her
rights. A class action solves this problem by aggregating the relainto something worth someone's
tively paltry potential recoveries
35
(usually an attorney's) labor.
Likely litigants elect in advance to require arbitration of consumer claims for a number of reasons, including a perceived risk of
unjustified financial consequences if such claims can be litigated in

arbitration clauses in their consumer contracts, including almost seventy percent of
businesses in the financial services category).
32 Id. at 65.
33 See Am. Arbitration Ass'n, American ArbitrationAssociation on Class Arbitration, at
http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15753&JSPaid=43408 (last visited Nov. 8,
2004). Following Green Tree, the AAA
is not currently accepting for administration demands for class arbitration
where the underlying agreement prevents class claims, consolidation orjoinder, unless an order of a court directs the parties to the underlying dispute
to submit their dispute to an arbitrator or to the Association. The arbitrability of class arbitrations where the parties' agreement precludes such
relief is a developing area of the law, and the Association awaits further guidance from the courts on this issue.

Id.
34

521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C.

INDUS.

& CoM. L. REv. 497, 497 (1969)).

35

109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997).
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courts as class actions. 36 The targets of consumer class actions are frequently heard to complain that such cases are manufactured by lawyers who obtain large attorney's fee awards for securing insignificant
benefits on behalf of a disinterested class. A recent change to Rule 23
underscores the importance of the judge's role in disciplining class
action attorney's fee awards. Rule 23(h), as amended in 2003, explicitly addresses class action attorney's fee awards and emphasizes the
court's responsibility to make specific findings on the value of what
the class has actually received and base the fee award on that value.3 7
Using the framework of Rule 23(h) to discipline attorney's fee awards
in consumer class action cases to ensure that the amount of the fee
bears a reasonable relationship to the benefits actually received by
class members may temper the incentives to bring cases that will not
result in a sufficient number of people actually receiving benefits so as
to justify a meaningful fee.
The pressures that lead to arbitration of consumer claims, particularly on a class basis, are many and large. Courts have not ceded the
"gateway" issues to arbitrators when those issues correspond
to what
Professor Resnik terms "due process procedures." Courts should continue to examine why litigants seek arbitration of specific types of
cases. Courts should examine whether there are perceived inadequacies in how such cases are litigated. That can be improved, not by
36 See, e.g., Martin Kasindorf, Robin Hood Is Alive in Court, Say Those Seeking Lawsuit
Limits, USA TODAY, Mar. 8, 2004, at Al (blaming "predatory trial lawyers and biased
judges who allow frivolous lawsuits by consumers to fleece businesses out of billions of
dollars" and'citing a $250 million jury award to a retired steelworker with asbestosrelated cancer and a $10.1 billion verdict against a cigarette manufacturer); Caroline
E. Mayer, Hidden in Fine Print: 'You Can't Sue Us" Arbitration Clauses Block Consumers
from Taking Companies to Court, WASH. POST, May 22, 1999, at Al (noting that the Na-

tional Arbitration Forum, a major arbitration provider, is encouraging adoption of
arbitration clauses in contracts as a way to avoid class action lawsuits); Jane Spencer,
SigningAway Your Right to Sue: In Significant Legal Shift, Doctors, Gyms, Cable Services Start
to Require Arbitration, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2003, at D1 (indicating that numerous con-

sumer s ervice providers are requiring arbitration in response to large class action settlement attorney fees and jury awards).

37 See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(h) ("In an action certified as a class action, the court may
award reasonable attorney's fee and nontaxable costs authorized by law or by agreement of the parties ....). The Committee's note accompanying Rule 23(h) emphasizes that:
Active judicial involvement in measuring fee awards is singularly important
to the proper operation of the class action process .... [T]he district court
must ensure that the amount and mode of payment of attorney fees are fair
and proper whether the fees come from a common fund or are otherwise
paid. Even in the absence of objections, ths court bears this responsibility.
FED. R. CIv. P. 23 advisory committee's note (2003 amend.).
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favoring one category of litigants over another, but by improving the
way in which courts do what courts do. Improving the conduct of
consumer class actions in the courts is one way for courts to respond
to the increase of class actions in arbitration.
II.

EXIT ISSUES AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION AwARDS

It is a truism that arbitration agreements in commercial transactions, often among sophisticated entities, reflect a number of con-

cerns. Business entities may prefer arbitrators knowledgeable in a
particular area and prefer to apply commercial standards to their disputes. In international transactions, arbitration agreements allow parties to select a forum in an unrelated country. It is also widely
recognized that arbitration agreements often reflect concerns about

the cost, delay, and exposure presented by litigation. 38 The literature,
however, reflects a growing dissatisfaction with commercial arbitration. 3 9 The cases paint a picture of proceedings that can drag on for
years. 40 The cases reflect uncertainty over the extent of obligations to
38 See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995) (noting
that legislative history of arbitration laws recognizes arbitration's advantages in flexibility, speed, and cost); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31
(1991) (stating that parties to an arbitration trade "the procedures and opportunity
for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of
arbitration").
39 See, e.g., Dinesh D. Banani, InternationalArbitration and ProjectFinance in Developing Countries:Blurring the Public/PrivateDistinction, 26 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. Rrv. 355,
384 (2003) (indicating that both foreign investors and developing countries "continue to grow increasingly dissatisfied with international arbitration"); Catherine
Cronin-Harris, Mainstreaming:Systematizing Corporate Use of ADtA 59 ALB. L. RE-v. 847,
856 (1996) (identifying rising dissatisfaction with arbitration due to increasing costs,
increasing judicialization, and lack of discovery, strict rules of evidence); Thomas J.
Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425, 430 (1988) (noting that
"proponents as well as critics of arbitration observe that it frequently fails to live up to
its billing as a 'speedy and economical' substitute for litigation, especially in large or
complex disputes" (footnote omitted)); Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Multi-Door Contract and Other Possibilities,13 OHIO ST.J. ON DISP. RESOL. 303, 354-55 (1998). Stipanowich explains:
The expansion of arbitration processes to accommodate virtually the full
spectrum of civil controversy has, however, recharged the ongoing debate
over the adequacy of existing arbitration procedures as a "surrogate" for the
court system. Perhaps for the same reasons, arbitration is now subject to
many of the same criticisms heaped upon litigation.
Id.
Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi
40 See, e.g.,
Negara, 364 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2004) (affirming the district court's confirmation of
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exchange information. 41 And at the end of the day, very large arbitration awards present the same concerns over exposure as worries over
jury verdicts. The difference is that in arbitration, these problems are
not leavened by some of the virtues of litigation-predictability as to
the rules that apply, particularly in discovery, and, at the end of the
day, some assurance of a critical and thorough review.
In commercial arbitration, the courts are with increasing frequency facing huge awards that generate impassioned pleas to correct
perceived injustices and errors underlying the tribunal's result. 42 The

law is, of course, clear that the ability of a court to correct such
problems is limited, but the grounds include what may be characterized as due process procedure. 43 Some contracts expand the grounds
foreign commercial arbitral award almost six years after initiation of the arbitration
proceeding); Tom Arnold, Delay and Cost Booby Traps in Arbitration Practiceand How to
Avoid Them, in ALI-ABA, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: How TO USE IT TO YOUR
ADVANTAGE 99, 103 ()an. 25-26, 1996) (highlighting one arbitration that lasted over
seven years, resulting in $61.5 million in attorney's and arbitrator's fees and $7.5 million on the merits).
41 See, e.g., Wendy Ho, Comment, Discovery in CommercialArbitrationProceedings,34
Hous. L. REV. 199, 200 (1997) ("Recently, however, the efficiency of commercial arbitration has decreased as a result of extensive discovery.").
42 See, e.g., Karaha Bodas Co., 364 F.3d 274.
43 The statutory grounds for vacatur of an arbitration award may be found in the
FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2000).
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award
upon the application of any party to the arbitration(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators,
or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
Id.
Several judicially-created grounds for vacatur have been recognized. See Kevin A.
Sullivan, Comment, The Problems of Permitting Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitration
Awards Under the FederalArbitrationAct, 46 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 509, 519-20 (2002) (listing
"manifest disregard of the law," "arbitrary and capricious," "public policy," and "essence of the contract" standards); Kergosien v. Ocean Energy, Inc., No. 03-20953,
2004 WL 2451351, at *9 (5th Cir. Nov. 2, 2004) (recognizing only manifest disregard
and public policy as nonstatutory grounds for vacatur, and stating that "[t]he parties
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available for vacatur. 44 Although searching, but limited, judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards is inconsistent with the notion that arbitration would free the courts of such cases and free the parties from the
litigation system, it is entirely consistent with Professor Resnik's point
when the arbitration
that the courts exert authority over arbitration
45
procedure.
raises issues of due process
Some litigation risks that attract commercial entities to arbitration may be changing. The Supreme Court's decision in State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell4 6 limiting punitive damages may make businesges less fearful of juries and judges. Professor
Resnik exhorts courts to look to arbitration, and arbitration to look to
courts, to see what they can learn from each other. Arbitration may
provide greater predictability in the rules that apply, particularly in
international disputes. The American Law Institute is nearing completion of its project on the Principles and Rules of Transnational
Civil Procedure, designed to apply in international commercial disputes. 4 7 Parties could contract to have these rules apply in arbitration
proceedings, removing the uncertainty that often accompanies such
proceedings as to what rules of discovery and evidence will be followed by a tribunal hearing an international or multinational dispute. 48 In that way, arbitration may become more like court
proceedings. But judges should continue to examine whether some
of the rules of litigation can and should be changed, in what they say
or how they are applied, to make the courts more responsive to the
needs of litigants. Courts must continue to examine ways to reduce
the cost and delay of litigation without turning judicial processes into
arbitration. One suggestion has been to develop a set of simplified
bargained for arbitration," adding that "[w]hen one bargains for arbitration, he bargains for the process as well as the results" and that "[i]f Ocean had wanted to have
the rigors of a federal court proceeding, it could have had them").
44 Compare Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 935 (10th Cir. 2001)
(noting that to allow parties contractually to expand judicial review of arbitration
awards undermines the policies behind the FAA), with LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera
Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 887-90 (9th Cir. 1997) (allowing private parties to alter standards ofjudicial review by their arbitration contract), and Gateway Tech., Inc. v. MCI
Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996-97 (5th Cir. 1995) (reversing the district court's
refusal to permit parties to appeal "errors of law" under the arbitration contract,
which "frustrate[d] the mutual intent of the parties").
45 Resnik, supra note 1, at 599-600.
46 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
47 See TransnationalCivil Procedure PrinciplesReceive Final Approval; FinalAction Deferred on InternationalJurisdiction andJudgments, A.L.I. REP., Summer 2004, at http://
www.ali.org (last visited Nov. 9, 2004).
48 Id.
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rules in the federal courts for certain kinds of civil cases that would
allow the parties to agree that in cases not presenting a damages potential above a certain dollar amount, the parties would engage in a
reduced amount of discovery and shorten the time to trial. The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has proposed
amendments to the discovery rules to accommodate the unique features of electronic discovery. 49 These proposed rule changes respond
to concerns that the volume and dynamic nature of electronic information make discovery even more costly and time-consuming, which
continue to lead potential litigants to seek alternatives to litigation.
The litigation issues courts encounter as parties enter into, then
exit from, arbitration inevitably draw attention to the proper roles and
relationship of litigation and arbitration. Whether courts can appropriately learn from and adopt some of the benefits of arbitration
brings together the work of lawyers, litigants, rulemakers, judges, and
all those seeking a more efficient, less costly way to resolve claims.
Contract procedure and due process procedure need not-must
not-inhabit different dispute resolution worlds.

49 See ADVISORY COMM. ON FED. RuLEs OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE CIVIL
RuLEs ADVISORY COMMITrEE 2-20 (2004), availableat http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
comment2005/CVAug04.pdf.

